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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a simple model of rent-seeking incentive to explain the emergence and dominance of the rapacious rent-seeking policies in a 
number of oil abundant developing and transition economies. The Hubbertian distribution of the commodity exports over time, the magnitude of 
these revenues, and the availability of offshore havens for the illicitly appropriated rent explain the shift from productive public policies to 
rapacious rent-seeking. In addition, we show that the existence of the well-functioning democratic institutions prior to the revenue boom precludes 
the emergence of rapacious rent-seeking institutions due to prohibitively high costs of rent-seeking. The paper complements the existing literature 
by delivering a novel theoretical rationale for the predisposition of the oil-rich countries to the resource curse.
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"A rogue once stolen his 100 000 thalers can live the  rest of his life as an honest man."
— Georg Christoph Lichtenberg —
1. DIFFERENT RESOURCE TYPES AND
RENT-SEEKING
In April 2003 Jonathan Isham from Middlebury College together 
with Michael Woolcock and Lant Pritchett from Harvard 
University and Gwen Busby from Cornell University published a 
survey on the nexus between the structure of the natural resource 
exports and the resource curse. The authors did not just detect the 
causal chain that runs from the relative share of natural resource 
exports to the choice of development strategies and economic 
growth but differentiated between different types of natural 
resource revenues. Isham et al. (2003) wanted to find out whether 
different type resources have diverging effects on economic growth 
and found out that “point-source” resources such as oil increase 
the probability of the resource curse. According to them “point-
source” resources affect economic growth negatively mainly over 
inferior institutional quality. The reason for a higher vulnerability 
of the countries which are abundant in oil and gas is explained by 
a higher degree of the spatial concentration of the export 
revenues and a more lootable nature of such resources, i.e. they 
can be easily appropriated by the ruling politicians.1 Van der 
Ploeg (2010. p. 2f.) in his model of “rapacious resource 
depletion” generalizes the problems related to extractive 
industries mentioned in Isham et al. (2003) as the problems 
caused by the insecurity of property rights.
The investigation conducted by Isham et al. (2003) was nothing 
but a revival of the basic principles of the export base theory 
that suggests that plantation agriculture was less conductive 
to economic growth than the peasant economy because of 
the weaker linkage effects to the rest of the economy. In the 
resource base theory, Baldwin (1956) concentrates mainly on 
the growth effect of different agricultural staples and explains 
the differences in lacking linkage effects and the enclave 
character of certain types of agricultural production. According
1 The term “point-source resources” was introduced by Isham et al. (2003). For 
more on the classification of the resources including “point-source 
resources” see Bavinck et al. (2014). p. 57 and Mavrotas et al. (2011). p. 
124-125.
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to them capital intensive staples like cotton and minerals 
contribute less to economic growth and development 
because of their lacking linkages with the domestic economy 
and predominantly enclave character that enables the transfer of 
the rent mainly to overseas rather than investing in the 
homeland. Lewis (1978) offered an alternative explanation for 
the relatively weak growth effects of the nineteenth century 
plantocracy in the southern states of the USA and similar 
colonial tropical regions. He argued that cheap labor supply 
and especially slave labor reduced redistribution of income 
and did not have the effect that could be observed in temperate 
frontier regions confronting wage pressure and better 
redistribution. Boschini et al. (2007) demonstrate that the 
effect of resources is not determined by resource endowments 
alone, but rather by the interaction between the type of 
resources that a country possesses, and the quality of its 
institutions. Further, the authors negate their institutional 
hypothesis during their discussion on the appropriation of a 
resource and show that resources that are very valuable, that 
can be stored, easily transported and sold, are, for obvious 
reasons, more attractive to anyone interested in short-term 
illicit gains. They find out that resources such as petroleum, 
diamonds or precious metals are potentially more 
problematic than agricultural products. This is a latent 
negation of their institutions hypothesis because they discover 
that the source of the institutional failure is in the type of the 
resources: If they are very valuable and can be appropriated in the 
short run, then the institutions tend to deteriorate. Institutions 
do matter but the primary reason is the type of the resource.
We agree with the above mentioned literature whereby we 
tend more to the line of argumentation in Lewis (1978) 
expressing the importance of geographical determinants in 
combination with institutions whereby we accept the 
primacy of the features of the resources (geographic, natural 
and technical aspects) over the pure institutions argument. 
Following this line, we suggest an alternative theoretical 
explanation for the perverse effects of the oil abundance 
empirically detected by Isham et al. (2003). It is not just the 
spatial and/or sectoral concentration of the resources in one 
sector and the ability to appropriate these resources. We 
argue that the large magnitude and positive skew of the oil 
revenues over time is one of the reasons of the so called 
resource curse resulting in lacking fiscal linkages, capital 
flight and strategic behavior of the incumbent government 
translating itself into low growth rates. This does not mean 
that these are the only or the most important causes which 
contain the positive growth effects of oil revenues on the 
manufacturing sector but at least from a theoretical point 
of view they seem to be fundamental ones.
Of course, the theory of Isham et al. (2003) makes sense regarding 
spatial concentration leading to enclave extractive industries. 
In addition, most of the developing and in all the oil-exporting 
economies in transition, oil revenues flow directly into the state 
budget. If one isolates the non-oil sectors of the economy from 
the oil sector, the output of the oil sector would not be affected 
significantly in a number of developing and transition economies. 
Nevertheless, a contrary argument from our side is the question of 
why the cocoa, rice, aluminum or flower production do not have the 
analogous adverse effects on rent-seeking and economic 
growth. The arguments in Isham et al. (2003) are more related 
to the backward and forward linkage effects of the oil and gas 
industries. These sectors are probably less integrated in the 
domestic economy than non-enclave agriculture. If so then it is a 
theoretical approach explaining rather production linkage 
effects than rapacious rent-seeking2. Of course production 
linkages encompassing both backward and forward linkages in 
the enclave industries could be a possible explanation of the 
economic failure of the oil-abundant countries (Hirschman, 
2013). Nonetheless, especially in the case of the petroleum 
abundant countries production and consumption linkages are less 
important than fiscal linkages (Morris et al., 2011. p. 19-21). 
That is why the theoretical explanation in Isham et al. (2003) can
only be a partial explanation of the resource curse or sluggish 
economic growth in the context of petroleum rich countries as 
production linkages do not capture the major, i.e. the fiscal 
aspect, of the oil-based economic development.
The reason why oil boom is associated with inferior institutions 
much more than with cocoa, rice or zinc is not the chemical 
formula of oil, and not the production function mainly reliant on 
imported technology but the large magnitude of these revenues 
and their positively skewed revenue generation pattern over 
time. An oil bonanza even in the years of low oil prices yields 
much more revenue than other revenue sources in a number of 
oil abundant countries. Especially in the first decade after 
commensuration of oil explorations and exports petroleum 
revenues create a huge intersectoral misbalance, especially in the 
countries with initially low GDP. For example, in Azerbaijan 
1991 oil exports constituted only 6,5% of GDP, in 2006, the year 
of big oil exports after opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline, this number jumped to 41,7%. Oil revenues 
constituted just 0,1% of the Iraqi GDP in 1970 and in 1974 this 
number was 40%. Oil exploitation and also oil price 
fluctuations, for instance, in 1979 after Iranian Revolution 
change the intersectoral revenue structure significantly. 
Empirical observations show that in most of the oil exporting 
developing countries this shift towards the oil sector has a 
durable character and is not a temporary phenomenon. The 
asymmetric flow of the petrodollars whereby on the one side we 
have a tiny non-oil sector with labor surplus economy and on 
the other hand a highly capital-intensive huge oil sector changes 
the relative importance of the economic sectors and as shall be 
shown later, also the incentive structure of the ruling elites too.
Hydrocarbons cannot be recycled and they vanish in the process 
of consumption or production. It is a nonrenewable resource 
which is available only for a limited time span. Studies on the oil 
decline curve analysis initiated in Arps (1945) and generalized 
in Hubbert peak theory considering both discovered oil deposits 
and future discoveries suggested in Hubbert (1956) show that 
especially the crude oil production quantity over time (both in 
singular and multiple oil fields cases) approximate a bell curve 
(Figure 1). Oil reserves reach relatively quickly peak production 
and as soon as the extraction has reached its peak, the oil 
extraction shifts relatively fast to the phase of exponential 
decline3.  In the case of other minerals and even  gas the  decline
2 The terms rapacious rent-seeking, corruption, and grabbing are used 
interchangeably in the discussion here.
3 For the difference between decline curves of oil and gas see Bentley (2002) 
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rate of resource extraction after the peak is much lower than in 
the case of oil (Höök, 2009. p. 26).
Despite criticism the Hubbert theory seems to hold for the most 
large oil-producing regions on the planet (Brandt, 2007). In 
the next subsections we shall try to analyze the impact of the 
asymmetric Hubbertian distribution model of oil production (and 
consequent revenue generation) on the incentive structure of the 
politically powerful groups. As we conduct this analysis in the 
framework of an infinite horizon, in the next subsection we shall 
discuss the theoretical rationale behind the infinite time horizon 
in the microeconomic modeling.
2. THE MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
OF THE INFINITE HORIZON
In microeconomics there are models with finitely-lived agents and 
models that have an infinite planning horizon. Despite the fact that 
individuals do not live forever, modeling with an assumption of 
infinite horizon has convincing microeconomic foundations. The 
first justification for the infinite planning horizon is the so-called 
Poisson death model (PDM) and the second one is the so-called 
bequest motive rising from intergenerational altruism. In PDM, 
the utility maximization of a finitely living individual converges 
with the maximization model identical to that in the model with 
infinitely living households. Despite wide applications in applied 
social science and epidemiology the central assumption of PDM, 
the assumption of the constant probability of death, v, for each 
year of life, is not realistic: Death probability is a function of age. 
This is why it is not straightforward to assume v to be constant 
(Acemoglu, 2009. p. 156f).
The second and more persuasive explanation, the so-called 
bequest motive or the model of intergenerational altruism 
assumes that the individuals live for a finite time and care about 
the utility of their offsprings and keep in mind that in turn their 
and Brandt (2006). For the discussion on the hyperbolic and harmonic 
decline patterns of oil resources see Höök (2008. p. 30-31).
offspring will care about the utility of their offspring, and so 
on. Thus the individual internalizes the utility of all future 
offspring infinitely. This utility mechanism explains dynastic 
preferences whereby decision makers act as if they had an 
infinite planning horizon.
3. UTILITY MAXIMIZATION OF THE
STATE ELITE
In this section we shall assume that the state elite maximizes its 
utility through maximization of its gross income (Igross) which 




tI is the legally determined salary of the head of the state
and other elite members in period t. vartI is illicitly appropriated 
rent seeking revenue in period t. We denote the sum of vartI  and 
fix
tI  as the gross income of the state elite in t, 
gross fix var
t t tI =I +I .
In the periods before the discovery of the oil reserves and the 
oil boom the economy consists of the manufacturing sector that 
operates under constant returns to scale and under conditions of 
perfect competition. Output in the manufacturing sector equals 
Ym and the tax rate imposed on the manufacturing output is τ. 
Tax revenue generated in the manufacturing sector, (YMτ), is 
the only revenue source of the government. Throughout the 
model we assume that tax revenue generated in the 
manufacturing sector is constant, e.g., YMτ does not change as a 
reaction to the changing behavior of the state elite and oil 
windfalls. This has no impact on the level of generality and 
simplifies the presentation5.
The government has to cover constant expenditure, C . This 
is the total and minimized expenditure of the government and 
covers the basic needs of its citizens and payments for major 
state institutions for the maintenance of the political power and 
stability. If the incumbent government does not cover C  then 
a regime change takes place. The next assumption and starting 
point of our analysis is that the roughly simplified hypothetical 
budget before discovery of oil fields and the beginning of oil 
exports is always balanced fixm(Surplus/Deficit = )C= Y I 0τ ⋅ − − 6. 
4 The state elite is a small and politically dominant group of persons. The 
notion of the state elite could imply different social structures in 
different sociopolitical milieus. For example in Eastern Europe this could 
be relatives or friends of the head of the state, in the Central Asian 
countries, clan or family members, in some Arab or African states, 
families and tribes3. Nevertheless, the constitutive feature of all types of 
the state elite is their political dominance translating into economic power. 
Werenfels (2004. p. 173-200) in the context of Algeria labels these elites 
as a core elite having direct ties to presidency. Abdelnasser (2004. p. 
118-123) describes in the context of Egypt the core elite as the first-circle 
technocrats, the president and major party politicians of the incumbent 
government. For Higley and Gunther (1992) elites are groups of persons 
shaping political outcomes in the most resource-rich organizations. The 
elites play a decisive role in the institutionalization of the distributive rules 
of the game and act as an active moment in the process of transformation 
(Rustow, 1970. p. 355).
5 For the assessment of the sensitivity of the manufacturing sector see Sadik-
Zada (2016): 57-68.
6 We include Ifix to the expenditure side due to the fact that it is being paid 
from the hypothesized state budget.
Figure 1: Hubbert curve
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This implies that before the resource windfalls, tax revenue from 
the manufacturing sector is just enough for the necessary state 
expenditure. The elite due to a constrained financial latitude has 
to endure a balanced state budget by intruducing and 
maintaining an efficient revenue and expenditure management. 
This argument is in line with the latitude and voice proposition 
of Albert Hirschman (1963. p. 1984), one of the luminaries of 
development economics, who argued that lack of latitude, i.e., 
constrained financial leeway of the elite in our context “… 
brings powerful pressures for efficiency, quality performance, 
good maintenance habits, and so on. It thus substitutes for 
inadequately formed motivations and attitudes, which will be 
induced and generated the narrow-latitude task instead of 
presiding over it.” The regime change assumption if C is not 
covered was also mentioned by Albert Hirschman in “Exit, 
Voice, and Loyalty,” a treatise on the social responsiveness on 
the public governance, whereby narrow-latitude tasks7 
correspond with covering of C in our context, he writes: 
“Narrow-latitude tasks will, if performed poorly and (ex 
hypothesi) disastrously, give rise to strong public concern and 
outcry – to voice.… a narrow-latitude task that, if neglected, is 
likely to give rapid rise to strong voice (the results of poor 
performance being intolerable)."8 Under such circumstances the 
government has no possibility of illicit private appropriation 
from the hypothetical budget: Illicit appropriation would 
cause a coup due to the uncovered basic needs of the 
population (τYm −C−Ifix −illicit appropriation<0). Under 
such circumstances the state elite earn only Ifix and has an 
infinite tenure.9
7 A narrow-latitude task is a task that has to be performed just right; otherwise 
there is a serious risk connected to public outrage and social unrest. One 
example from a different context is the example with the engine of an 
airplane. The producer has to produce a well-functioning engine; this is a 
minimum that is expected from an airplane producer. If this condition is not 
fulfilled, then protests are inevitable. Cf. Hirschman (1984. p. 99).
8 Hirschman (1984). p. 100.
9 The assumption of infinite t enure c ould s ound a s b eing t oo unrealistic. 
Nevertheless, if we take the countries with working (mature) democracy 
as an example, this assumption is not that unrealistic. Let us take the case 
of a working democracy with two parties that form the government, e.g., 
the Republican and Democratic Parties in the United States, the Christian 
Democratic Union and Social Democratic Parties in Germany, the Labour 
and Conservative Parties in Great Britain. If we can assume that these 
parties would continue forever, then for how long would last the tenure of 
each of these two parties? Even if we consider the fact that the Democrats 
in the United States systematically have won less in the elections than the 
Republicans have and that is why they have different probabilities of being 
elected then in an abstract sense the time span of being in power for both of 
the parties equals infinity. This is a mathematical result on the basis of the 
assumption of the further existence of the respective parties. Let us assume 
that the probability that the Democrats would win the elections equals 0.3 
and the probability that the Republicans would win the elections equals 
0.7 then the total duration of the tenure equals(0.3 × ∞) for Democrats and 
(0.7 × ∞) for Republicans. If we take into account that (0.3 × ∞) = ∞ and 
(0.7 × ∞) = ∞ then both of the political parties at least theoretically have 
an estimated tenure of ∞. This result would be the same also with three or 
more parties. The same result holds if we take the examples of other mature 
democracies with established large political parties and consider a whole 
party and not particular individuals as the holders of power. There are a 
number of studies on longevity of tenure suggesting that the longevity of 
the governments is longer in the oil-rich developing countries (Andersen 
and Silje (2012), Ombga (2009)). Nevertheless, if we redefine longevity not 
as an uninterrupted tenure of a personified political group but as the sum of 
the tenure of the not personified political force with interruptions then we 
A sudden discovery of oil reserves and subsequent oil exports 
cause a budget surplus because of additional revenue sources. 
We denote oil revenues by R. If the elite decides to introduce 
institutions prioritizing no more efficiency but rather rent-seeking 
targets10 then this causes additional costs. Appropriation of the 
illicit income, Ivar, requires a change of the institutional setting 
from production friendly to rent seeking/grabbing institutions. 
This requires additional costs like expenses of political 
bargaining, costs for registration and management of 
offshore companies for the organization of capital flight and 
political bargain which imply the creation of public sector jobs 
with very low or no productivity etc. (Sadik-Zada, 2016).
We denote these costs as Crent–seeking and call them transaction costs 
of rent seeking. As a result the hypothetic budget has now the 
following structure if rapacious rent-seeking takes place:11
fixed
m rent-seeking 0Surplus= Y +R C C Iτ − − −  (1)
The state elite following rent seeking aims by establishing grabbing 
institutions entirely appropriates the surplus in Equation (1). An 
alternative to grabbing, e.g., illicit appropriation of the budget 
surplus is re-investment of the surplus in the manufacturing 
sector. In this paper we do not consider here the adverse effect 
of rent-seeking on growth. This issue comes under scrutiny in a 
number of other papers (Anderson and Boettke, 1997).
Confronted with oil windfalls, the politically influential elite get an 
additional option. If before the oil boom the government was forced 
to sustain economic efficiency and consequent growth or at least 
maintain the achieved level of tax revenue, now with additional 
oil revenue, R, and the resulting budget surplus, the elite is not 
confronted with the previous pressure and has even the resources 
for illicit personal enrichment.12 The feasibility of illicit personal 
enrichment depends also on the institutional setting prior the 
boom. If the boom happens in a mature democracy with production 
oriented institutions and a high level of transparency then inducing 
rapacious institutions could have prohibitive transaction costs, 
Crent–seeking. In contrast, in countries with inferior political and 
economic institutions, in face of a low level of accountability 
and transparency, these costs would be much lower than in  
mature democracies. For the oil-and gas-rich countries of the 
former USSR with high level of concentration of political power 
in the hands of a strong executive and weak legislative and 
judicative powers, weak transparency and accountability, there 
are  favorable   preconditions   for   the   prosperity   of  grabbing 
would see that on average in the mature democracies the longevity of the 
tenure of a political party is much higher than in the oil-, gas-, diamond- or 
gold-rich autocracies.
10 Mehlum et al. (2006) denote rent-seeking activities and installation of the 
institutions enabling rent-seeking as “grabbing.” In the following, we shall 
use the grabbing as a notion describing the sum of rent-seeking activities. 
11 Without grabbing Crent–seeking = 0. 
12 This argument is in line with the arguments in Hirschman (1967) regarding 
latitude conjecture and somehow with Lewis (1978) whereby the adverse 
effects of plantocracy and slavery in the southern states of the United 
States were explained by relatively low wage pressure in these areas. 
Northern states without abundant labor were forced to increase the 
efficiency due to wage pressure and that’s why they developed a more 
effective and innovative economy than the south of the United States.
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institutions favoring inefficient rent-seeking targets of the 
ruling elite (Anderson and Boetke, 1997. p. 37-53).
If in the absence of oil fields, the political and economic 
institutions had to be led by the target of efficiency increase and 
were productive, now after the discovery of oil fields, as have 
to be proven in the following, under some conditions, illicit 
appropriation starts to be the major target of the incumbent 
government. With the oil boom the satisfaction of the required 
expenditure C is no more dependent on the quality of public 
management and institutional framework provided to the private 
manufacturing. Even with an inferior institutional quality the elites 
can continue their tenure. Like Lewis (1978) but in a different 
context, abundance of one of the production factors decreases 
the pressure imposed by scarcity that leads to higher efficiency.
After a commodity boom there is a more inefficient cost structure 
and a share, χ∈[0;1], of Crent–seeking has to be maintained. χ represents 
costs of political bargain such as artificially created jobs and wages 
over marginal productivity in the public sector that cannot not 
be adjusted immediately. Hence, the condition of the balanced 
budget  after depletion of oil reserves shall not be given, i.e.  
fixed
m rent-seeking 0( ×Y C C I <0)τ χ− − − .
This implies that after depletion of oil reserves a LDC has the same 
level of tax revenues (τ∙Ym) but higher costs increased by χCrent–seekig. 
The elite shall not be able to stay in office after a commodity boom 
is over because the revenue side, τYm, does not cover the costs 
side and implies a deterioration of the standard of living increased 
during the boom by means of artificial employment and other forms 
of political bargaining. Of course, if the increased inefficiency in 
public spending due to political bargaining, χCrent–seekig, is eliminated 
then the tenure could continue. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
imagine that immediately after the boom the government could 
easily reduce the social standards, eliminate artificial employment 
in the public sector, cheap water, electricity and gasoline provided 
during the boom. All these steps would create public unrest and 
regime change. This assumption of a sticky political bargain is 
an analogue to sticky wages concept of Keynes but in a different 
context13 and in line with the results of empirical analysis of 
Ponticelli and Voth (2011) on the causational relationship between 
social unrest and budget cuts in Europe between 1919 and 2009.14
Hence, establishing grabbing institutions implies the limitation of 
tenure that was assumed to be infinite under efficient institutions 
without rent seeking: Announcement of an austerity package after 
depletion of oil reserves would be unavoidable. Nevertheless, 
the state elite would not be able to convince the disillusioned 
population to support the tenure of the old elite and would with a 
13 Sticky wages is an economic hypothesis that the pay of employed workers 
tends to respond slowly to the changes in a company’s or the broader 
economy’s performance. When unemployment rises, the wages of those 
workers who remain employed tend to stay the same or grow at a slower 
rate than before rather than falling with the decrease in demand for labor. 
Specifically, wages are said to be “sticky-down” since they can move up 
easily but move down only with difficulty.
14 As an indicator of social unrest Ponticelli and Voth (2011) choose the sum 
of demonstrations, riots, assassinations and general strikes.
high probability require a regime and elite change (Haggard and 
Kaufman, 1995).
Confronted with an oil boom, the state elite have to make its 
decision about the management of oil revenues and consequently 
about its political future. The decision diagram of the state elite 
with two following options is illustrated in Figure 2:
1. Continuation of the old efficient economic policy with
productive institutions, or
2. Inducing grabbing institutions damaging economic efficiency.
The first option implies infinite tenure with a fixed legal income, 
Ifix. And the second option implies the limitation of the tenure 
to the time span of an oil boom but extension of the fixed legal 
income by the illicit (rent-seeking) income, Ivar, as long as there 
are essential oil exports generating budget surplus.15 In order to 
choose between these two options, they have to be compared in 
monetary terms over an assumed time horizon of infinity. To do 
this, we shall use a technique introduced by the founder of dynamic 
optimization Richard Bellman and divide infinity in two parts 
(Bellman, 1957). Part one is the period with oil and part two is the 
rest of the time till infinity. By dividing infinity into the oil phase, 
(0; t0), and the after-oil phase, (t0; +∞), we are able to scrutinize 
the consequences of the concentration of the oil revenues in time, 
e.g., positively skewed distribution of oil windfalls over time as
shown in the upper graph of Figure 2. We have a maximization 
problem with an infinite horizon, whereby the elite has to choose 
between the above mentioned options.
15 Of course there are also other benefits like prestige, power and many other 
immaterial benefits of staying in power which are differently weighted by 
different political leaders depending on the matrices of their personality. We 
do not consider this aspect in our model. In addition, we do not consider the 
law of diminishing marginal utility of wealth. Studies on happiness show 
that the personal fortune after achieving the threshold of 50 million USD 
brings no additional utility to its owner. This is also a limitation of our 
model. Nevertheless, if we would make an assumption that the grown-up 
offspring of the elite members also enter to the group and the number of elite 
members is growing then the issue of diminishing marginal utility would 
be partly solved. This is especially straightforward for the dynastically 
organized elites. 
Figure 2: Decision diagram of the state elite after the discovery of oil 
fields
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If the elite chooses the option without rent-seeking (non-
grabbing) then they would earn Ifix infinitely period after period. 
Otherwise if they choose the first option (grabbing) then the 
gross income, I0gross, in the boom period, t0, is determined in 





M 0 rent-seeking 0
plus  0






M rent-seeking 00I Y +R C C >Iτ⇔ = − − (3)
gross
0I  with grabbing institutions in (2) is larger than the total
income of the state elite without grabbing institutions (the positive 
difference equals the budget surplus generated in the oil phase 
which is assumed to last for only one period). Because it is hard 
to imagine that the legal remuneration of the state elite members 
could be greater than the budget surplus in the oil bonanza period, 
t0 Illicit appropriation of budget surplus causes the end of the 
tenure of the state elite with the end of t0. In all of the following 
periods, the state elite separated from tenure would not have the 
fixed remuneration I0
fixed . Nevertheless, they could receive the 
interest for investing I0
gross in the foreign offshore havens
providing security in form of banking secrecy and asset 
protection for the illicitly appropriated rent and having 
negligible or no capital income taxation. The high risk of 
expropriation of the illicit income after revolution is the major 
reason for investing Ivar in the offshore havens.
The next important question is the question regarding the interest 
rate of the mentioned hypothetical deposit of the elite. Is this the 
domestic interest rate? This is with a high probability not the case. 
The data on capital flight and tax evasion shows that the illicit money 
from the developing and transformational economies flow mainly 
to the financial havens like Cyprus, British Virgin Islands, Panama, 
etc. Data provided by the International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists shows that Europe, the UAE and offshore financial oases 
are the major destination of the illicit petrodollars from the petroleum 
exporting developing and transition economies.16 Nevertheless, the 
interest rates in these havens are much lower than in the developing 
or transition economies. Due to safety provided in the financial oases, 
the state elite applies the interest rate in the oases, ioases, that is lower 
than the domestic interest rate idom for the comparison of the options 
illustrated in Figure 2.17 This implies that the elite despite residing in its 
home country has an orientation interest rate of a foreign jurisdiction.
For the comparison, the elite employs the following decision 
rule: If the net present value (NPV) of the fixed income which 
is nothing but perpetuity (annuity with no end) is larger than the 
gross income, I0
gross , then the elite does not choose grabbing
policy, e.g., economic course prioritizing rent-seeking targets 
and neglecting long-run sustainability. The NPV of a 







16 For diverse articles on this issue see www.icij.org .
17 This assumption is based on the observation that industrialized, relatively 
capital-rich countries and offshore oases have in the rule lower interest 






I >I =Y +R C C
i
τ − −  then the government 
continues a non-grabbing course because staying in power for 
infinity brings more utility than grabbing in t0 yields.
Otherwise if the NPV of the fixed income paid as perpetuity 






I <I =Y +R C C
i
τ − − (5)
As can be seen from the Equation (4) a higher resource revenue, 
R, brings the elite closer to the threshold from where grabbing 
starts to be optimal for the profit maximizing elite. The 
transaction costs of rent-seeking, Crent–seeking, take the elite apart 
from this threshold. Nevertheless, in the countries encountered 
with the black gold bonanza with inferior institutions before the 
discovery of oil fields, the probability that Crent–seeking could 
overcompensate the effect of R is usually not that high due to 
lack of well-functioning democratic institutions leading to public 
transparency and accountability.18 Both equations show that the 
magnitude of oil revenues, R, and the institutional quality prior 
to oil boom, which determine the amount of Crent–seeking, play  a 
central role in the decision regarding inducing grabbing 
institutions or relinquishing them. Black gold bonanza generates 
large windfalls and leads to abrupt but tempotaty rise of of the 
budget revenues. The revenue generation path of the agricultural 
commodities like cacao, maize, rice etc. do not lead to this kind 
of abrupt revenue increases and do have a long-lasting impact on 
the revenue structure of the respective developing nations. This 
could be an explanation for the corresponce of oil revenues 
with inferior institutional quality and the resource curse more 
than other commodity exports with a more even and sustainable 
revenue generation trajectory.
4. TIMING OF EXPLOITATION
Another question is the timing of the exploitation. When does 
the ruling elite start to explore and exploit the reserves? In the 
framework of our model the incumbent government could also 
start the exploitation as latest as possible because there could be 
financial rationale behind such a strategy if the price of the reserves 
increases with the interest rate as expected by the Hotelling model. 
This implies that the ruling elite gets Ifix for a very long time and 
then starts to exploit the reserves. Doing so they could increase 
their total income.
However, there are also factors that make the immediate 
exploitation more probable. First, the continuation of the public 
governance with restricted financial resources contributes to the 
development of progressive political and economic institutions and 
makes the ruling elite more accountable in its public finance and 
18 Traditionally low open budget index values of the oil- and gas-rich states 
also vindicate this expectation. Despite membership in the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative of a number of the oil abundant 
countries, these countries still do not have a good level of transparency and 
civil society participation in revenue and expenditure management.
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economic policy. The strengthening of the civil society challenges 
the assumption of infinite duration for the rule of the incumbent 
government. Another risk connected to the conservation 
strategy is the competition of different political groups. Further,  
small developing or transition economies, are often urged my 
external factors like large oil companies supporting political 
forces that promote rash exploitation rather than conservation  
(Browne, 2010). Most developing and all transition economies 
have not had any intentional delays in the exploitation of its oil- 
and gas deposits.
5. THE EFFECT OF A MORE EVEN
DISTRIBUTION OF THE OIL WEALTH 
OVER TIME
In the previous subsection, we have shown that nonrenewable 
resource revenues could give an incentive to induce rent-seeking 
activities. This subsection is a sophisticated version of the 
presented model which shows the impact of the scale of the 
positive skewness of the distribution of the resource revenues 
in time on the incentive structure. Concretely in our context, 
the increase (decrease) of the scale parameter of distribution of 
oil revenues in time means that a given stock of oil is extracted 
in more (less) time periods. For instance, assume that a given 
petroleum stock of 1000 million barrels could be extracted and 
sold in one period. If the scale parameter of the distribution of 
oil revenue in time doubles, then the given 1000 million barrels 
of petroleum would be extracted in two periods implying that 
the same oil revenue flow in the hypothetical state budget would 
take place not in one but in two subsequent years. Analysis of 
these two scenarios enables the comparison of the effect of higher 
concentration of oil income on rent-seeking incentive. Whereby 
in contrast to Isham et al. (2003) we do not scrutinize the spatial 
concentration of resources in one province or concentration of 
revenue influx in one hand but in time.
Suppose that the resources concentrated in one period in the 
previous model (Figure 3a) are distributed over two periods (Figure 
3b). The difference between a case where all the nonrenewable 
revenues are concentrated in just one period and a case whereby 
the revenues flow into the budget over many periods is:
1. In the time value of these revenues, and
2. Transaction costs of rent–seeking, Crent–seeking.
In the previous model we assumed that if the elite chose the rent 
seeking course then they appropriate the whole surplus in period 
t0 whereby the surplus equals 
fix
M rent-seekingY +R C C Iτ − − −   .
Now we assume that the same oil deposit, R, can be extracted in 
two time periods, in t0 and t1.
The half of R flows in the hypothetical budget in t0 and the rest 
(R/2) in t1. In addition to this, we assume that the potential rent 
seeking revenue cannot be illicitly privatized by the elite without 
transaction costs, Crent–seeking. We assume that if the elite continues 
rent-seeking course in t1 then the economy will have transaction 
costs, Crent–seeking, both in t0 and t1. In Figure 3B we illustrate 
only the case whereby transaction costs in t1 are the same as in 
t0. Nevertheless, these costs could vary. The costs of political 
bargaining, payments for overseas company management and 
registration, fake directorship fees, costs of increased repression, 
etc. could have both increasing and decreasing forms depending 
on the concrete situation in the developing or transformational 
country. In addition to this, Crent–seeking could vary over time due 
to changing external factors like anticorruption legislature in the 
countries where the parent company of the oil extracting company 
resides, or due to the introduction of anti-corruption legislature 
by supranational organizations like the European Council. 
One could suggest that these costs could decrease due to the 
creation of the rent seeking institutions in the previous period, 
e.g., in t1. For instance the elite could use the offshore company
or bank account created in, t0 or increase expenditures due to 
increasing social pressure of the population foreseeing an 
economic collapse after the resource boom. This could be the 
case especially in the countries with a high level of education, 
social networks and developed civil society freedoms. Hence, 
the assumption of constant transaction costs of rent-seeking is a 
rough simplification that could be abolished in the more 
sophisticated models focusing on the dynamics of Crent–seeking.
Based on constant Crent–seeking, the NPV of the gross income of the 
elite, Igross−t, for the case where all the revenue flows just in one 
period, t0 I
gross−1 and the case where the same revenue flows over 
two periods, t0 and t1, I
gross−2 shall be compared.
The NPV of the gross income of the elite in the two period model, 
Igross−2, can be determined as follows:
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We denote in (5) and in the following equations the tax revenue 
generated in the manufacturing sector, YMτ, assumed to be constant 
with a roof as MY τ  in order to avoid confusion regarding the 
impact of the tax revenue on Igross. For comparison, Itotal−1 for the 
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Now let us compare the NPV of Igross−2 and Igross−1 in (6) and (7). 
For this we subtract (6) from (7). The difference shows whether 
grabbing or efficient resource management is more advantageous 
for the state elite. In both cases, MY τ  is constant. The fourth and 
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fifth terms in (6) and (7), C  and Crent–seeking are also equal. This 
yields the following result in Equation (8):
fix fix
rent-seeking1gross 1 gross 2
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2 1 r

























As we know from the introducing assumptions of the model, 
in a situation without oil revenues, the conditions for the 
balanced hypothetical budget were assumed to be given 
fix
Msurplus=Y C I =0)τ− − . This implies that 
fix
MY C=Iτ−  and 







. This means that (6) can be reduced to the following form:
fix
rent-seekinggross 1 gross 2
1 2
R
CR I2I I = +
























 is positive because the 







 has a positive sign. This implies that due to 









−  and additional costs 
of rent seeking incurring the second year, the NPV of the gross 
income of the elite is less in the case of a stretched two-period oil 







   , the result implies that with a more even
distribution of the revenue the NPV (Igross) tends to diminish and in 
the theoretical extreme case if n → ∞  then R 0
n
→ . Under such 
conditions, efficiency oriented public management is the dominant 
strategy and rent-seeking makes no sense for the state elite.
Nevertheless, as seen from (8), the second term on the RHS, 
fixI
1+r ,




− . By equating the RHS of (8) to zero, we could find the
condition where the interest and transaction cost effects of revenue 
stretching can be compensated by Ifix in t1 which is provided due 




CR I 2 0
2 1+r 1+r 1+r
− − + = (10)
fix rent-seeking





Multiplying both sides of (10) by (1−r) yields the following 
expression:
( )fix fixrent-seeking rent-seeking
rRI 1+r R R+2 C I = +C
2
⇔= − ⋅ (12)
The last equation sets the condition for indifference and 
implies that if the fixed income of one additional year in power 
compensates the loss of interest due to discounting of R
2
 and 
transaction costs for rent seeking for one additional year then the 
elite is indifferent. However, in the rule the legal income of the 
elites in the transformational and developing countries is relatively 
small. Hence, it is probable that the bigger concentration of the 
revenues creates larger gross revenue for the elites. Thus we could 
Time Time
2





∈ (0; ) ∈ ( ,+∞)
0
A





Figure 3: Variations of the scale parameters of the distribution of the oil revenues over time. In A oil revenue, R, flows into hypothetical budget 
in one and in B in two periods in two equal rates, R/2. In B we illustrate only the case whereby - Crent–seeking in t0 and in t1 is the same. Nevertheless, 
cases with decreasing of increasing transaction costs are also thinkable
a b
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show that it is more advantageous for the elites if the revenues 
have a high degree of concentration in time.
We can conclude that a more even, e.g., stretched distribution of 
the revenue from the same oil stock, R, implies a smaller NPV 
of the gross income. A further stretching of the resource stock 
over time means a decrease of the NPV of the gross income and 
in the theoretical extreme case if the given stock of resources R 








, overturns and efficiency oriented public 
management turns to be the dominant strategy of the politically 
powerful utility maximizing elite.
6. CONCLUSION
We have suggested a novel theoretical rationale for the emergence 
of the rapacious rent-seeking in the oil abundant countries. 
Based on a simple multiple-period model in the tradition of 
positive economics, we have shown that a large magnitude of oil 
windfalls, the nonrenewable character of these revenues expressed 
Hubbertian distribution, the availability of the financial havens 
and the level of democracy prior to the oil revenue boom could 
explain the emergence of rapacious rent-seeking in a number oil-
rich countries. In addition, we could show that in the societies with 
good institutional preconditions the implementation of grabbing 
strategies is less probable due to the high transaction costs of 
rent-seeking, Crent-seeking. Alongside Crent-seeking, the level of the legal 
remuneration of the incumbent state elite, fixtI , could also play 
decisive a role in the strategy choice of the state elite. In Equation 
(12) we derive It
fix  that overweighs the factors contributing to rent-
seeking incentives. We conclude that at least in the context of the 
presented theoretical model the revenue distribution patterns are 
able to determine incentive structure of the state elite and 
explain the deterioration of the quality of public policy in the 
absence of prohibitive costs of rapacious rent-seeking.
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